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SUMMARY 
 
The protection that employees enjoy under our common law in the transfer of a 
business of its employer is very little.  Common law only concerns itself with the 
lawfulness of a contract of employment.  Common law is, however, now also 
experiencing the effect of the Constitution which provides for fair labour practices. 
 
Proper legislation was enacted to afford employees proper protection against 
dismissals resulting out of a transfer of a business by the employer as a going 
concern. 
 
Such a dismissal would be automatically unfair in terms of section 187(1)(g) of the 
LRA. 
 
The protection that employees enjoy is governed by section 197 of the LRA. 
 
This section provides that the new employer is placed in the “shoes” of the old 
employer.  It also further states that the new employer could be held accountable for 
the unlawful actions of the old employer against an employee prior to the transfer 
taking place. 
 
Section 197 of the LRA, however, does not apply to all transfers of businesses.  
There are some key concepts that are of importance to determine its applicability.  
Such concepts include whether there was a transfer of a business or a part of the 
business and whether it was transferred as a going concern. 
 
The words “transfer” and “business” are defined in section 197(1)(a) and (1)(b) of the 
LRA. 
 
However, the words “going concern” are not defined and one would have to 
scrutinise case law for guidance in considering whether the transfer was done as a 
going concern. 
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A leading case is that of Schutte v Powerplus Performance (Pty) Ltd.1  In this case 
the court held that one must consider the substance of the agreement in determining 
whether the business was transferred as a going concern.  It further held that the lists 
of factors that one should have regard to are not exhaustive. 
 
Section 197 of the LRA also applies to employees whose services have been 
outsourced. 
 
Outsourcing of services occurs where an employer discontinues a service or activity 
that is in most cases not part of the main business of the employer, and contract an 
outside contractor to take over that service or activity. 
 
This matter was given clarity in the case of SA Municipal Workers Union v Rand 
Airport Management Company (Pty) Ltd.2 
 
The court came to the conclusion that section 197 could apply to outsourcing, 
provided it passes the test of “transfer” as well as the test of what constitutes a 
“business or service”. 
 
Outsourcing to labour brokers is, however, not covered by section 197 of the LRA. 
 
The matter was given consideration by the Labour Court in CEPPWAWU v Print 
Tech (Pty) Ltd.3 
 
Another question is whether second-generation outsourcing is covered by section 
197 of the LRA. 
 
Second Generation Outsourcing occurs when an employer put the outsourced 
service out to tender upon the outsource contract coming to an end and a new entity 
is awarded the outsourcing opportunity following the original outsource entity being 
unsuccessful in its bid to secure the contract for an additional term. 
                                                          
1
  (1999) 20 ILJ 655 (LC). 
2
  (2005) 26 ILJ 67 (LAC). 
3
  [2010] 6 BLLR 601 (LC). 
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A leading case dealing with second-generation outsourcing is Aviation Union of 
South Africa v South African Airways (Pty) Ltd.4 
 
The court accepted that a purposive interpretation of section 197 rather than a literal 
interpretation thereof should be followed in consequence of the literal interpretation 
might having the result of excluding second-generation employees from the 
protection of section 197 of the LRA.  It would undermine the clear purpose of the 
LRA. 
 
In the matter of NEHAWU v UCT5 the Constitutional Court laid down the purpose of 
section 197 of the LRA. 
 
Ngcobo J held as follows: 
 
“The concept of fair labour practice must be given content by the legislature and 
thereafter left to gather a meaning, in the first instance, from the decisions of the 
specialist tribunals including the LAC and the Labour Court.  These courts and tribunals 
are responsible for overseeing the interpretation and application of the LRA, a statute 
which was enacted to give effect to s 23(1).  In giving content to this concept the courts 
and tribunals will have to seek guidance from domestic and international experience. 
Domestic experience is reflected both in the equity-based jurisprudence generated by 
the unfair labour practice provision of the 1956 LRA as well as the codification of the 
unfair labour practice in the LRA. International experience is reflected in the 
Conventions and Recommendations of the International Labour Organisation. Of 
course, other comparable foreign instruments such as the European Social Charter 
1961 as revised may provide guidance.” 
 
The Aviation case however was recently taken to the Supreme Court of Appeal by 
SAA. 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal held that the Labour Appeal Court had erred in 
following a purposive interpretation of section 197 of the LRA.  It held that the courts 
should not read in words where legislation is clear and unambiguous.  The only 
instance where words should be read into a piece of legislation is if such piece of 
legislation is unconstitutional. 
                                                          
4
  2010 (4) SA 604 (LAC). 
5
  (2003) 24 ILJ 95 (CC). 
 v 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal held that section 197 of the LRA does not apply to 
second generation outsourcing. 
 
Employees also enjoy protection against the insolvency of an employer and the 
transfer of the business as a going concern as the result of the employer‟s liquidation 
or sequestration.  This provision is covered by section 197A of the LRA. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
What happens to employees in the sale of a business or a takeover by another 
employer?  This is one of the great concerns of employees when informed that the 
business is being sold or being taken over by a new employer. 
 
Employees are under the misconception that once a business is sold their 
employment relationship automatically terminates. 
 
This however was the situation under common law prior to the implementation of 
section 197 of the LRA 
 
The protection that employees enjoyed under our common law in the transfer of a 
business of its employer was very little.  Common law only concerned itself with the 
lawfulness of a contract of employment. 
 
Prior to the implementation of labour law legislation governing the transfer of an 
undertaking, an employer had the right to choose whether or not he wants to contract 
with the employees.  This was part of the notion of a persons‟ right to “freedom of 
contract”. 
 
This right was confirmed in the case of Ntuli & Others v Hazelmore Group t/a 
Musgrave Nursing Home.6 
 
It was held by the Industrial Court that a transferor of an undertaking cannot transfer 
his or her obligation under a contract of service to the transferee of the undertaking 
without the consent of the employee first having been obtained. 
 
The Industrial Court also suggested that there was a duty, not only on the seller, but 
on the purchaser to consult with the employees prior to the transfer of the business. 
                                                          
6
  (1988) ILJ 709 (IC). 
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Because of the lack of labour legislation on this matter, the Industrial Court provided 
for general guidelines in the transfer of a business to protect the rights of employees 
and to prevent unfair labour practice. 
 
In Kebeni v Cementile Products (Ciskei)7 the Industrial Court laid down some of 
these guidelines and requirements. 
 
The court provided that the seller (the “old employer”) had to consult with its 
employees prior to the sale of its business and that the purpose of the consultation 
would be to discuss the measures to be taken on how to protect the interest of the 
employees and the preservation of the employment relationship in the transfer of a 
business. 
 
The problem with our common law principle of “freedom of contract” was problematic 
in the sense that it was two sided.  Not only had the employee the choice whether or 
not he wanted to work for the new employer, but the employer also had the choice 
whether or not he wanted to take on the services of the old employee or terminate 
the employment contract. 
 
From the above it is clear that the common law provided insufficient protection to the 
employee in the case of the transfer of an undertaking. 
 
The above being one of the main reasons for implementation of labour legislation 
and more particular section 197 of the Labour Relations Act. 
 
Section 197 also relates to the common law in that it provides for the consent of the 
employee in the event of the contract of employment being transferred. 
 
Section 197 however contains express exceptions to this rule in the event where a 
business is being transferred in whole or part and as a going concern; or where the 
                                                          
7
  (1987) 8 ILJ 442 (IC). 
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whole or any part of the business is transferred as a going concern where the 
employer is insolvent and being wound-up or is being sequestrated; or because the 
scheme of arrangement or compromise which is being entered into is to avoid the 
winding-up or sequestration of the employer for reasons of insolvency. 
 
Although the employee, under common law, had a right to sue his “old” employer for 
damages in the event of his employment contract being terminated by the “new” 
employer, this protection was meaningless in the case where the “old” employer was 
insolvent. 
 
Another reason for the implementation of section 197 is to give effect to a South 
African citizen‟s right to fair labour practice as entrenched in our Constitution. 
 
In NEHAWU v UCT8 the Constitutional Court looked at the concept of fair labour 
practice. 
 
It was held that the concept of fair labour practice is not capable of precise definition 
due to the tension between the interest of workers and the interest of employers that 
is inherent in labour relations.  Therefore it must be given its content by the 
legislature and by gathering meaning from decisions of specialist tribunal which 
includes the Labour Appeal Court and the Labour Court. 
 
The courts will have to seek guidance from domestic and international decisions in 
giving content to this concept and may have regard to foreign instruments as well. 
 
The court thus has a crucial role to ensure that the right to fair labour practice is 
honoured. 
 
The court also has an important supervisory role to ensure that legislation giving 
effect to constitutional rights is properly interpreted and applied. 
 
                                                          
8
  (2003) 24 ILJ 95 (CC). 
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In the above case the court also looked at the concept of fairness and whether it only 
attains to employees. 
 
The court referred to the case of National Union of Metalworkers of SA v Vetsak Co-
operative Ltd and Others9 which held that: 
 
“Fairness comprehends that regard must be had not only to the position and interest of 
the workers, but also those of the employer, in order to make a balanced and equitable 
assessment.” 
 
A similar view was expressed by Nienaber JA in the NEHAWU case.  He wrote: 
 
“The fairness required in the determination of an unfair labour practice must be fairness 
towards both the employer and employee.  Fairness to both means the absence of bias 
in favour of either.” 
 
The court held that the purpose of the LRA 
 
“is to advance economic development, social justice, labour peace and the 
democratization of the workplace”. 
 
On the purpose of section 197 of the LRA there seems to be a two-fold view. 
 
The majority view is that the primary purpose is to facilitate the transfer of the 
business, whereas the minority view is that its purpose is the protection of workers in 
the event of the transfer of the business. 
 
Nienaber JA is of opinion that the answer lies somewhere in between. 
 
The conflict that lies in the transfer of business is the employers‟ interest in the 
profitability, efficiency or the survival of the business appose to the workers‟ interest 
in job security and the right to freely choose an employer. 
 
                                                          
9
  1996 (4) SA 577 (A). 
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The common law provided very little protection to the workers in these situations.  
Under common law the sale of a business resulted in the loss of employment. 
 
The Industrial Court did attempt to remedy this situation by providing certain 
guidelines and requirements which needed to be followed by an employer when he 
wanted to sell his business.  One such duty that was imposed on the employer was 
to consult with his employees prior to the sale of his business. 
 
Later a statutory duty was also imposed on the employer to pay severance packages 
to their employees, but this situation had the potential to impact the economic 
development negatively as well as undermine the promotion of labour peace. 
 
Section 197 provides for relieve to employers and employees by aiming to minimize 
the tension between the employers‟ interest and that of the employees. 
 
Ngcobo J in the NEHAWU case held that section 197 has a dual purpose; it 
facilitates the commercial transactions in the sense that the new employer need not 
to find new employees who have no experience and who have never done the work 
before and in the same time provides for job security of the employees. 
 
From the above it is clear that a future employer cannot pick and choose which 
employees to take on; they also cannot dismiss an employee because a transfer has 
taken place.  Section 197 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 regulates the 
transfer of a business.  The purpose of this section is to protect the employment 
security during transfers. 
 
The effect of section 197 has far-reaching implications for the new employer, which 
implications are dealt with herein at a later stage. 
 
Section 197 does, however, not apply to all transfers of business.  The wording of the 
section contains some key concepts which are discussed in Chapter 1 hereof with 
reference to case law. 
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But what about the rights of employees when a business management decides to 
outsource its services?  This situation is also dealt with in Chapter 2 hereof.  
Outsourcing to labour brokers is discussed in Chapter 3.  The importance here is to 
establish whether section 197 of the Labour Relations Act applies to such 
outsourcing. 
 
In Chapter 4 the effect of section 197 on both the “old” and the “new” employee is 
discussed. 
 
Chapter 5 deals with the rights of employees who have been dismissed as a result of 
a section 197 transfer. 
 
Another concern for employees is how their employment contracts are affected if 
their employer is sequestrated or his business is liquidated.  Section 197A of the 
Labour Relation Act deals with this situation.  In the past the approach has been that 
in the case of an insolvent employer, all contracts of employment with employees 
terminate automatically.  
 
Section 38 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 provides for the suspension of all 
contracts of employment between an employer and its employees, which section also 
now includes the duty to consult before suspending.  This matter is given more 
consideration in Chapter 6 hereof. 
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CHAPTER 2 
REQUIREMENTS FOR SECTION 197 OF THE LRA AND THE SCOPE 
OF ITS APPLICATION 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
A transfer of business takes place where an entity is transferred from one business to 
another as a going concern and retains its identity after the transfer. 
 
Section 197 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA) only applies in the case of 
a “transfer of a business”. 
 
It is important to look at the definition of the phrases “transfer” and “business” as 
defined in the Act when establishing the applicability of section 197. 
 
Business is defined in section 197(1) (a) of the LRA as: 
 
“… the whole or a part of any business, trade, undertaking or service”, 
 
and “transfer” is defined in section 197(1)(b) of the LRA as: 
 
“… the transfer of a business by one employer („the old employer‟) to another employer 
(„the new employer‟) as a going concern”. 
 
In Schutte v Powerplus Performance (Pty) Ltd10 the court gave a broad definition as 
to what will be regarded as a “transfer” as defined in the LRA.  
 
It held that a business may be transferred in circumstances other than a sale.  
 
A transfer arising from a merger, takeover or a part of a broader process of 
restructuring within a company or groups of companies will also be included in the 
definition of “transfer” for the purposes of section 197. 
                                                          
10
  (1999) 20 ILJ 655 (LC). 
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The facts of the case were as follows: 
 
The employees had been employed in three workshops by Super Rent, a car rental 
company, which was a division of Super Group.  Their work entailed repairing and 
servicing Super Rental vehicles.  Super Rent then entered into an agreement in 
terms of which it sold 50% of its shares to Powerplus. 
 
Powerplus would purchase all the workshops belonging to Super Group and continue 
to service Super Rent vehicles. 
 
The employees at Super Group workshops were informed that the workshops were 
closing down and they were informed that they would be retrenched. 
 
Some of the employees accepted positions at Powerplus, but claimed that they were 
entitled to the same pay as they had received at Super Group. 
 
In making its decision in regard to that transfer of the business of Super Group did 
take place, the court considered the following: 
 
- The aspect dealing with the transfer of the employees; 
- the transfer of stock and equipment; and 
- the sharing of premises. 
 
The court also considered the following facts: 
 
- There had been no interruption of service provided by the workshops; 
 
- there had been a simultaneous transfer of certain managerial staff; 
 
- that the parties had regarded the arrangement as an alternative to closure of the 
workshop; and 
 
- the retrenchment of the maintenance staff. 
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It is important that the business had to be transferred “as a going concern”. 
 
A distinction is often made between a sale of shares, a sale of assets and the sale of 
the business itself. 
 
It is often argued that the sale of shares and sale of assets are excluded from section 
197 as these do not constitute a transfer of a business as a going concern. 
 
In Kgethe v LMK Manufacturing11 the Labour Court held that a sale of assets of a 
business did not constitute a transfer as a going concern. 
 
In this case the applicants were employed by the first respondent up until 30 June 
1997.  During the first half of 1997 the first respondent experienced some financial 
difficulties.  In order to avoid its liquidation, management held that they had three 
options to consider.  Firstly the sale of the shares, secondly the sale of the business 
as a going concern and thirdly the sale of all or a part of the assets of the 
respondent. 
 
The first respondent decided to exercise the third option and an agreement was 
concluded between the first and the second respondents under the heading 
“Agreement of Sale of Assets”. 
 
The employees were informed on the 13th of June 1999 by management, in the 
person of one Fraser, of the financial difficulties that the first respondent was facing 
and also of the options available to the first respondent, which at that time was either 
liquidation or sale including take over of debt. 
 
They were advised that the first respondent was doing its best to secure employment 
for the employees. 
 
                                                          
11
  [1997] 10 BLLR 1303 (LC). 
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Fraser, however, did not inform them about the agreement between the first and 
second respondents concerning the sale of the assets.  
 
On 17 June 1997 a fax was sent to Fraser in which the complaints were raised that 
the first respondent had entered into negotiations with the prospective buyers without 
prior consulting with the union, NEWU.  The details of the buyers and terms 
pertaining to the negotiations had not been disclosed as well as that the jobs of 
NEWU members had been placed at risk by the first respondent.  
 
One Nomvela, from NEWU, demanded an undertaking from Fraser that the sale of 
the business would be suspended until the first respondent had complied fully with 
the provision of section 189 of the LRA, which deals with the dismissal of employees 
due to the operational requirements of the employer. 
 
A meeting was conducted on 19 June 1997 in which Fraser advised Nomvela that 
the subject to be discussed was not a “takeover” but the sale of the first respondent‟s 
assets.  Nomvela then requested that Fraser confirm that the employment of all the 
existing employees had been secured in the negotiations with the second 
respondent. 
 
Fraser handed him a letter from the second respondent dated 19 June 1997 which 
read as follows: 
 
“This serves to confirm that the weekly paid permanent employees presently employed 
at LMK Manufacturing (Pty) Ltd will be re-employed subject to acceptance of new 
employment contracts and working conditions.” 
 
He further advised that casual workers, whose names appeared on a list which was 
later furnished to NEWU, would not be re-employed. 
 
On 20 June 1997 NEWU received a fax from apparently a labour consultancy firm 
acting on behalf of the first respondent which letter recorded that: 
 
“(a) the meeting of 19 June had been held in order to discuss „the sale of the 
company‟; 
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(b)  NEWU had been apprised of the reasons urgently necessitating „the sale of the 
assets of LMK‟, which reasons were repeated in the letter; 
 
(c)  NEWU had been advised that an application for the liquidation of the first 
respondent had been put on hold pending „the sale of LMK and payment of 
creditors by 30 June 1997‟; 
 
(d)  for liquidation to be avoided it was crucial that the sale „take place‟ on 30 June; 
 
(e) NEWU had been informed that „the sale of the assets‟ had been agreed upon 
between the first respondent and another company, the agreement being that the 
new owners would acquire the assets of the first respondent and would in turn 
pay the creditors of the latter; 
 
(f) in order to distance itself from the bad name of the first respondent in the market 
place the purchaser was starting a new company; 
 
(g) a copy of the sale agreement with the heading „Sale of Assets‟ reflecting the 
name of the new company and the names and addresses of its directors had, in 
confidence, been handed to NEWU; 
 
(h)  NEWU had been advised that jobs had been secured for all permanent wage 
employees as from 1 July on the same conditions and at the same wages as then 
prevailed and that a letter to that effect had been handed to NEWU, and that 
different provisions - the details need not be set out - relating to the termination of 
the employment of the casual workers (who were divided into two categories) and 
their possible re-employment would operate.”
12 
 
The above clearly did not reflect the true situation and another letter was sent by fax 
to NEWU on 21 June 1997 by Fraser, reading as follows: 
 
“The remuneration will not be less than that presently paid by LMK. The hours of work 
and other benefits will be in line with the Basic Conditions of Employment Act. Any 
benefits presently enjoyed, which do not comply with the Basic Conditions Of 
Employment Act, will be brought in line with the requirements of this Act, whether this 
means reducing or improving such benefit.” 
 
NEWU requested the labour consultancy company to provide them with the details 
and copies of the first respondent‟s bank statements, a list of assets and debts, a 
copy of the agreement relating to the sale of the assets, full particulars of the 
creditors and the amounts owed to them by the first respondent, proof from the 
Registrar of Companies relating to the change of the company‟s name, details of the 
existing contract relating to casual workers and proof that the agreement of sale of 
                                                          
12
  Kgethe v LMK Manufacturing para 13. 
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the assets stipulated that all permanent-wage employees will work on the same 
terms and conditions with same wages. 
 
NEWU further indicated in the letter that it did not accept the terms of the casual 
workers. 
 
There was no response to this letter. 
 
At a further meeting on the 23rd of June 1997 Nomvela again demanded that all 
employees be retained on terms and conditions not less favourable than those 
prevailing.  It is the contention of Nomvela that Fraser refused to address this 
“repeated request”.  Fraser, however, on the other hand contended that he could not 
bind the purchasers to any agreement, but that he would speak to the buyers and 
revert back to NEWU. 
 
Fraser failed to revert to NEWU despite further demands by NEWU that should the 
demand not be met, they will approach the court for appropriate relief. 
 
Another dispute that occurred at the meeting on the 23rd of June 1997 was the 
averment by Fraser that he offered the agreement of sale of assets to NEWU for 
inspection, but that the offer was refused by NEWU.  Nomvela denied that such an 
offer had been made and averred that Fraser had consistently denied them access to 
the agreement on the ground of confidentiality.  
 
Despite the above, it is an agreed fact between the parties that NEWU did not view 
the agreement. 
 
Fraser sent a letter to all the staff members on the 23rd of June 1997 which read as 
follows: 
 
“Please be advised that LMK Manufacturing (Pty) Ltd has been sold and we hereby 
give you one week‟s notice. 
 
LMK Manufacturing (Pty) Ltd was faced with the option of either liquidating the 
company or selling the company.  With the sale of the company we have been able to 
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secure the employment of all permanent weekly paid staff.  Should the company have 
been liquidated, everybody would have lost. 
 
Please be advised that the new owners will be taking over on the 1st July 1997. 
 
We thank you for your service and loyalty during the period that you were employed by 
LMK Manufacturing (Pty) Ltd and wish you the best for the future.” 
 
Fraser only responded to NEWU‟s letter of 23 June 1997 on the 25th of June 1997 
which letter read as follows: 
 
“With reference to the above fax please take notice of the following points. 
 
We have sold the assets of LMK Manufacturing (Pty) Ltd. It is not a takeover. 
 
At the last meeting held at our offices on the 23/6/97, we gave you the opportunity to 
read the „Sale of Assets Agreement‟ and a schedule of the liabilities of the company. 
From this you would have seen for yourself that LMK cannot continue to trade and that 
there are not any funds available for severance packages. 
 
We have done everything in our power to ensure that as many [employees] as possible 
are given employment with the new buyers. 
 
All [employees] of LMK Manufacturing have been given a [week‟s] notice on the 
23/6/97. They will be paid this week‟s notice/severance plus all leave pay outstanding. 
This is in terms of the Labour Relations Act No 66 of 1995 which you refer to in your fax 
of 21st June 1997. 
 
We sincerely hope that you do not find it necessary to take this matter to the Labour 
Court in view of the above information, but should you do so, we will defend the 
matter.” 
 
The applicants launched an urgent application with the Labour Court on the 27th of 
June 1997 for relief in the form of a rule nisi together with an interim order.  The 
matter was postponed to the 1st of July 1997 by agreement. 
 
On interpretation of the applicants‟ papers the judge contended that what the 
applicants sought was information which related to the retrenchment or termination of 
the services of the applicants and secondly compliance with the employer‟s duty in 
terms of section 197 of the LRA. 
 
The Labour Court held that section 197 was not applicable to the sale of the assets 
and that there was no entitlement to any information bearing on an alleged non-
compliance with the provisions thereof. 
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In Ndima v Waverley Blankets Ltd and Sithukuza v Waverley Blankets Ltd13 the court 
had to consider the issue of the sale of shares.  The court held that a distinction 
should be made between the transfer of a business as a going concern and a 
transfer of possession and control of the business; as a consequence the sale of 
shares seemed to be excluded from section 197. 
 
The LRA does not define the concept “as a going concern”, which causes great 
confusion. 
 
A leading case dealing with the requirement “as a going concern” is Schutte v 
Powerplus Performance (Pty) Ltd.14 
 
The court held that one must consider the substance of the agreement in determining 
whether the business is transferred as a “going concern”. 
 
Factors which the court considered in determining whether the transfer is one of a 
going concern can also be found in the above-mentioned case.   
 
In this case the court took the following factors into account in finding that there was 
a transfer of a business as required in terms of section 197: 
 
- Pre-existing relationship between the buyer and seller; 
- a previous in principle agreement to sell a certain part of the business; 
- the wording of the contract itself; 
- the fact that the buyer did employ the majority of the employees;  
- the use of the same premises by the buyer; and 
- continuation of the same activities without interruption. 
 
The court held that no exhaustive list of factors exists to determine whether a 
business is transferred as a going concern.  
                                                          
13
  (1999) 20 ILJ 1563 (LC). 
14
  (1999) 20 ILJ 655 (LC). 
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A number of factors which will be regarded as relevant are whether the assets 
transferred are both tangible and intangible, whether or not workers are taken over 
by the new employer, whether customers are transferred and whether or not the 
same business is being carried on by the new employer. 
 
If the above two mentioned requirements are present, the transfer of the business will 
be considered to be one to which section 197 of the LRA is applicable and the 
employees will enjoy its protection. 
 
To establish whether section 197 will also be applicable to the outsourcing of service 
by an employer it is firstly important to establish what is meant by the outsourcing of 
service. 
 
Outsourcing occurs when an employer discontinues a service activity and decides to 
outsource such activity which might have otherwise been performed by its employees 
to a third party. 
 
Outsourcing will take place where an employer discontinues a service or activity, that 
is in most cases not part of the main business of the employer, and contract an 
outside contractor to take over that service or activity. 
 
An important question that arises here is whether outsourcing such an activity 
amounts to a transfer of a business or service which attracts the applicability of 
section 197 of the LRA. 
 
In the case of SA Municipal Workers Union v Rand Airport Management Company 
(Pty) Ltd15 the Labour Appeal Court had to consider the question of whether an 
outsourcing agreement can be deemed to be a sale of a portion of a business.  
 
The first respondent, namely Rand Airport Management Company, operated and 
managed the Rand Airport.  It experienced some financial problems and indicated 
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  (2005) 26 ILJ 67 (LAC). 
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that certain specialised services appeared to be more costly when conducted “in 
house” and indicated that it wanted to outsource the non-core activities, namely 
Security, Garden Services and Cleaning. 
 
On the 21st of July 2002, Rand Airport Management Company gave notice that the 
non-core activities will be outsourced and on the same date sent out letters to the 
affected employees informing them that they will be retrenched due to operational 
reasons and not due to a transfer in terms of section 197. 
 
The matter was brought before the Labour Appeal Court which had to decide 
whether there had been a transfer of business as contemplated in terms of section 
197 of the LRA. 
 
The court considered the definition of “service” and held that both gardening and 
security functions fell within the definition. 
 
Accordingly the court held that gardening and security services would be capable of 
being transferred if they passed the test of a “transfer” as well as the test of what 
constitutes a “business or a service”. 
 
In making its decision the court referred to the Constitutional Court case of NEHAWU 
v University of Cape Town16 in establishing the meaning of the phrase “transfer of a 
business as a going concern”. 
 
In this case the Constitutional Court had to decide whether the outsourcing of the 
University‟s cleaning, maintenance and gardening functions constituted a takeover of 
a going concern. 
 
The union applied to the Labour Court for a declaratory order to the effect that the 
employment of its members had been transferred to a number of service providers, 
on the same terms and conditions, when the university outsourced the gardening, 
maintenance and security functions.  
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The union lost, primarily because the court took the view that there had been no 
transfer of a part of the University‟s business as a going concern.   
 
The union applied to the Constitutional Court for leave to appeal, which was granted.  
 
The Constitutional Court overruled the interpretation given to section197 by the 
Labour Appeal Court.   
 
A purposive approach to section 197 required that consideration of work security be 
given primacy, and on this basis, the court held that section 197 had an automatic 
and obligatory effect.  In other words, as soon as a commercial transaction assumed 
the form of the transfer of the whole or part of a business as a going concern, then 
the contract of employment of the old employer‟s employees transfer to the new 
employer, unless there is a contracting out of the consequence in terms of the 
section.  
 
The intentions of the two employers are irrelevant.  The transfer takes place by 
operation of law. 
 
The court stated that a number of factors should be taken into account when 
considering the question whether a transfer of a business was transferred as a going 
concern, which factors include: 
 
- In regard to the transfer or not of assets, both tangible or intangible, whether or 
not workers are taken over by the new employer; 
 
- whether customers are transferred; and 
 
- whether or not the same business has been carried on by the new employer. 
 
The court held that the above lists are not exhaustive and should not be considered 
in isolation.  A determination must be made on a case-to-case basis. 
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The Constitutional Court found that the facts before it did amount to a takeover as a 
going concern and accordingly attracted the applicability of section 197 of the LRA.  
 
The Constitutional Court also considered whether an agreement to transfer the 
employees from the “old” employer to the “new” employer was a prerequisite before it 
would constitute a transfer of a business as a going concern.  The court found that 
such an agreement was not a prerequisite.  
 
The Constitutional Court further held that the LRA does not define the concept “going 
concern”.  
 
It held that the ordinary meaning must therefore be given to the concept, and that 
what must be transferred be a business in operation “so that the business remains 
the same but in different hands”. 
 
Each matter must be determined objectively and in the light of the circumstances of 
each case.  Regard must be given to the substance and not the form of the 
transaction. 
 
The Constitutional Court dealt with the concept of “going concern” as follows: 
 
“[56] The phrase „going concern‟ is not defined in the LRS. It must therefore be given 
its ordinary meaning unless the context indicates otherwise.  What must be 
transferred must be a business in operation „so that the business remains the 
same but in different hands‟. Whether that has occurred is a matter of fact which 
must be determined objectively in the light of the circumstances of each 
transaction. In deciding whether a business has been transferred as a going 
concern, regard must be had to the substance and not the form of the transaction. 
A number of factors will be relevant to the question whether a transfer of business 
as a going concern has occurred, such as the transfer or otherwise of assets, 
both tangible or intangible, whether or not workers are taken over by the new 
employer, whether customers are transferred and whether or not the same 
business has been carried on by the new employer.  What must be stressed is 
that this list of factors is not exhaustive and that none of them is decisive 
individually.  They must all be considered in the overall assessment and therefore 
should not be considered in isolation. 
 
[57] There is nothing either in the context or language of section 197 to suggest that 
the phrase „going concern‟ must be given the meaning assigned to it by the 
majority.  On the contrary, the purpose of the section and the context in which that 
phrase occurs suggest otherwise. 
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[58] The fact that the seller and the purchaser of the business had not agreed on the 
transfer of the workforce as part of the transaction does not disqualify the 
transaction from being a transfer of business as a going concern within the 
meaning of section 197.  Each transaction must be considered on its own merits, 
regard being had to the circumstances of the transaction in question.  Only then 
can a determination be made as to whether the transaction constitutes the 
transfer of a business as a going concern.” 
 
The fact that the transferor and transferee had not agreed on the transfer of the 
employees of the transferor, does not disqualify the transaction from being a transfer 
of a business as a going concern and not attracting the applicability of section 197 of 
the LRA.  Each transaction must be considered on its own merits. 
 
Zondo J in the case of Rand Airport set out the steps one should have regard to in 
determining whether there has been a transfer. 
 
The first would be to have regard to the meaning of the word “business” in section 
197, which was amended to include “service”. 
 
The court turned to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary for the definition of service. 
 
The word “service” is defined in the aforesaid dictionary as: 
 
“The provision of a facility to meet the needs or for the use of a person or a person‟s 
interest or advantage; assistance or benefit provided to someone by a person or thing; 
an act of helping or benefiting another; an instance of beneficial, useful or friendly 
actions; the action of serving, helping or benefiting another; behaviour conductive to the 
welfare or advantage of another, friendly or professional assistance.” 
 
The LRA states that a service includes even internal services of a business 
insignificant to the service provided by the business to outsiders. 
 
The next step is to determine whether the activity or service that is being outsourced 
can be regarded as a service, business or part of a business.  
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In answering this question, both the Labour Appeal Court and the Constitutional 
Court, referred to the case of Spijkers v Gebroeders Benedik Abbatoir v Alfred 
Benedik en Zonen17 which laid the test down as follows: 
 
“The decisive criterion … is whether the business in question retains its identity.  
Consequently a transfer of an undertaking, business or part of a business does not 
occur merely because its assets are disposed of. Instead it is necessary to consider … 
whether the business was disposed of as a going concern, as would be indicated, inter 
alia, by the fact that its operation was actually continued or resumed by the new 
employer, with the same or similar activities.” 
 
It held that the determination is an objective determination and cannot be conclusive. 
The court referred to a number of factors in making the determination of the aforesaid 
phrase: 
 
- What will happen to the goodwill of the business, the stock-in-trade, the 
premises of the business, contract with clients or customers, the workforce, the 
assets of the business; 
 
- whether there has been an interruption of the operation of the business and, if 
so, the duration thereof; 
 
- whether same or similar activities are continued after the transfer or not or 
others; 
 
- whether the entity in question retains its identity. 
 
The Labour Appeal Court in the Rand Airport case, however, concluded that the facts 
of this particular matter did not amount to outsourcing as no outsourcing agreement 
was entered into and no outsourcing took effect between the respondents. 
 
The court came to the conclusion that section 197 could however apply to 
outsourcing, provided it passes the test of “transfer” as well as the test of what 
constitutes a “business or service”. 
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The court concluded that a “service” for the purpose of section 197(1)(a) must 
embody an entity with a separate management structure with its own goals, assets, 
customers and goodwill and that, accordingly, the transfer of the “gardening function” 
of the Rand Airport did not constitute a part of business as defined and that there 
was no transfer of this function as a going concern.  
 
The court held that section 197 did not apply where nothing more than an activity is 
outsourced.  In this case the court held that the gardening services were not an 
entity, they had no management structure, assets, goodwill, goals or customers to 
speak of and were “merely an activity”. 
 
2.2 WHAT ABOUT SECOND-GENERATION OUTSOURCING? 
 
Second-Generation Outsourcing occurs when an employer put the outsourced 
service out to tender upon the outsource contract coming to an end and a new entity 
awarded the outsourcing opportunity following the original outsource entity being 
unsuccessful in its bid to secure the contract for an additional term. 
 
Does section 197 of the LRA apply to Second-Generation Outsourcing?  
 
A leading case dealing with second-generation outsourcing is Aviation Union of 
South Africa v South African Airways (Pty) Ltd.18 
 
In this case the court had to decide whether business that had been outsourced and 
was being transferred from one contractor to another, attracted the applicability of 
section 197 of the LRA. 
 
The primary employer, SAA contracted with LGM to provide certain services to it.  
Part of the initial service agreement was that all affected employees of SAA would be 
transferred to LGM in terms of section 197 of the LRA. 
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Before this contract expired, LGM changed ownership and SAA cancelled its contract 
with LGM, advertising for tenders for the relevant services with no provision that 
employees be transferred to the successful new contractor. 
 
The employees of LGM, fearing and facing the possibility of retrenchment, launched 
an urgent application with the Labour Court for an order, amongst others, declaring 
that the termination of the LGM contract or the appointment of a new service 
provided constituted, or would constitute, a transfer of the undertaking or services 
provided by LGM to SAA, declaring that the termination of the employees 
employment would constitute an automatically unfair dismissal, restraining SAA from 
itself performing any of the services provided by LGM or permitting any other party to 
do so until the employees were transferred to SAA or to any new service provider, 
and restraining LGM from dismissing the employees until their transfers had been 
effected. 
 
As the above amounted to a second-generation outsourcing, the issue before the 
court was whether section 197 of the LRA was applicable. 
 
In outsourcing transactions, the business of the old employer may be transferred to a 
new employer only in the first transfer and therefore the Labour Court held that 
section 197 can only be applicable to first-generation outsourcing. 
 
The Labour Court referred to the decision of Cosawu v Zikhethele Trade (Pty) Ltd19 
and held that this case was the only authority for the proposition that, where the 
second business was so closely aligned to the first business that it was, in fact, 
identical and section 197 might be applicable. 
 
The facts of Zikhethele were as follows: 
 
Fresh Produce Terminals at the Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and Durban harbours 
outsourced the terminal and stevedoring serviced to outside companies which 
ultimately became Khulisa.   
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The two main players in Khulisa were the managing director, Mr Mfundisi and Mr 
Immelman, the operations director.  As a result of an acrimonious dispute between 
these two directors, Fresh Produce Terminals rethought its relation with Khlulisa.   
 
It put its terminal and stevedoring contracts out to tender and two new companies 
tendered for the business, namely Zikhethele, run by Mfundisi, and a company 
formed by Immelman, trading as Signal Hill.  Fresh Produce Terminals awarded the 
outsourcing contract to Zikhethele, whereupon Signal Hill launched an urgent 
application in the High Court to interdict the implementation of the contract.   
 
In the interim COSAWU wrote a letter to Mfundisi to enquire if the Khulisa employees 
were to be retrenched or whether they would transfer in terms of section 197 to 
Zikhethele.  Mfundisi did not provide a candid response, possibly as a result of some 
of the Khulisa employees supporting Immelman‟s bid for the contract. 
 
On the 1st of April 2005, the day when Zikhethele stepped into the shoes of Khulisa 
as Fresh Produce Terminals‟s service provider, Mfundisi in his capacity of Managing 
Director of Zikhethele informed all Khulisa employees that they were seconded to 
Zikhethele from the 1st of April to the 11th of April.  
 
The purpose of the secondment seems to have been motivated by the fact that the 
application launched by Immelman‟s company to undo the outsourcing between FPT 
and Zikhethele would be heard on the 11th of April 2005.   
 
The matter was not heard on that date and on the 26th of April 2005 Mfundisi 
addressed a second memorandum to Khulisa employees informing them that their 
secondment would end the 29th of April 2005. 
 
The employees of Khulisa were invited to apply for positions with Zikhethele if they 
wished to be employed by Zikhethele, which indicated that there would be no 
automatic transfer of employer from Khulisa to Zikhethele.   
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On the 26th of April 2005 an application was made to place Khulisa under provisional 
liquidation, which order was granted on the 5th of May 2005. 
 
As it was evident that only those employees who formally applied for positions at 
Zikhethele would be employed by Zikhethele, COASWU launched an application in 
the Labour Court to declare that all the rights and obligations between Khulisa and 
Khulisa employees, not employed by Zikhethele, transferred automatically in terms of 
section 197 of the LRA to Zikhethele when it won the contract to provide the terminal 
and stevedoring services to FPT. 
 
In considering whether second-generation outsourcing attracted the applicability of 
section 197 of the LRA the court stated as follows: 
 
“Although the matter was not pertinently argued before me, a compelling argument can 
be made, based on the express language in section 197 of the LRA, that the 
requirement in section 197(1)(b) that a transfer of business be by one employer to 
another precludes its application to second generation contracting-out, because in such 
arrangements nothing is transferred by the old employer to the new employer. Hence, 
second generation contracting out is effectively exempted from the application of 
section 197.” 
 
The court also considered foreign jurisprudence, more specifically European law. 
 
The court considered the UK Court of Appeal decision in Dines v Initial Services20 
which formulated a second-generation transfer as a two-phased process, the first 
being the handing back of the service by the first contractor to the primary employer 
and the second phase being the granting by the primary employer of the service to 
the second contractor. 
 
Although European law does not rely on the concept of a going concern, our courts 
have relied heavily on what constitutes a transfer of a business in European law in 
interpreting a transfer of a business as a going concern. 
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The court found in this case that there were significant features present to indicate 
that there was a transfer of a business as a going concern and accordingly that 
section 197 of the LRA is applicable. 
 
Factors which gave rise to the court‟s decision above are: 
 
- The history of the outsourcing activities was such that the service provided had 
remained almost identical from the first outsourcing to the present. 
 
- The same jobs had to be done. 
 
- The jobs were done in the same location. 
 
- The jobs were done by using the same operational methods. 
 
- The same premises, fittings and equipment used by Khulisa were now at the 
disposal of Zikhethele. 
 
- Some of the suppliers appeared to be the same. 
 
The court also took into consideration the fact that in the event of the employees not 
enjoying the protection of section 197 of the LRA, it would result in their being not 
only without employment, but also without any payment of severance pay because 
Khulisa was in the process of being wound-up. 
 
Despite the court acknowledgment of the above in the matter of Aviation,21 it 
concluded that the Zikhitele decision is the only authority for the proposition that, 
where the second business is so closely aligned to the first business, it is in fact 
identical, section 197 of the LRA being applicable. 
 
The Labour Court found that section 197 is not applicable to second-generation 
outsourcing.  
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It held that affected employees may pursue a remedy in terms of section 189 of the 
LRA. 
 
The court held that the business of the old employer can only be transferred to the 
new employer in the first transfer. 
 
Basson J concluded: 
 
“I am not persuaded that, in the light of the expressed and unambiguous wording of 
section 197(1)(b), that it would be appropriate to interpret section 197(1) to also apply 
to a transfer „from‟ one employer to another as opposed to a transfer by the „old‟ 
employer to the „new‟ employer.” 
 
The court further held, although an agreement between the new and old employer to 
transfer employees is not a pre-condition for section 197 transfers, it was clear that 
SAA did not wish to take over employees of LGM. 
 
The matter went on appeal.22 
 
On appeal the Labour Appeal Court considered the two schools of thought, the literal 
school of thought which consists of giving the “ordinary meaning” to the words of 
section 197, and the purposive school of thought. 
 
The court held that in following the literal approach of section 197 it would have the 
effect of the section being inconsistent with provision of section 3 of the LRA which 
reads: 
 
“Interpretation of this Act: 
 
Any person applying this Act must interpret its provisions - 
 
(a) to give effect to its primary objects; 
(b)  in compliance with the Constitution; and 
(c) in compliance with the public international law obligations of the Republic.” 
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The literal approach will have the effect of limiting the application of section 197 and 
not to extend its application to further transfers. 
 
In the matter of NEHAWU v UCT23 the Constitutional Court laid down the purpose of 
section 197 of the LRA. 
 
Ngcobo J held as follows: 
 
“The concept of fair labour practice must be given content by the legislature and 
thereafter left to gather a meaning, in the first instance, from the decisions of the 
specialist tribunals including the LAC and the Labour Court. These courts and tribunals 
are responsible for overseeing the interpretation and application of the LRA, a statute 
which was enacted to give effect to s 23(1). In giving content to this concept the courts 
and tribunals will have to seek guidance from domestic and international experience. 
Domestic experience is reflected both in the equity based jurisprudence generated by 
the unfair labour practice provision of the 1956 LRA as well as the codification of the 
unfair labour practice in the LRA. International experience is reflected in the 
Conventions and Recommendations of the International Labour Organisation. Of 
course other comparable foreign instruments such as the European Social Charter 
1961 as revised may provide guidance.” 
 
The Constitutional Court held that the purpose of section 197 is twofold: firstly to 
protect workers and secondly to facilitate transfers of businesses. 
 
The Labour Appeal Court in Aviation turned to the purposive school of thought. It 
held that in following a purposive interpretation of section 197 would have the effect 
of ensuring the applicability of section 197 to the situation. 
 
Murphy AJ suggested that to achieve the purpose of section 197 the word “from” 
must be read into the place of the word “by” in section 197 to avoid the problem 
created by the word “by” in this section. 
 
The court accepted that a purposive interpretation of section 197 rather than a literal 
interpretation thereof should be followed, as following the literal interpretation would 
have the result of excluding second-generation employees from the protection of 
section 197 of the LRA. It would undermine the clear purpose of the LRA. 
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The court demonstrated its decision in following a purposive interpretation by 
referring to other case law such as Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO & others24 and 
Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd.25 
 
In Carephone the ground justifiability or rationality, although not appearing in section 
145 of the LRA as a ground for review, was read by the court into the section to bring 
it in line with the interim Constitution. 
 
The words “subject to” were also read into section 158(1)(g) to replace the word 
“despite” to bring that provision in line with the Constitution. 
 
In Sidumo the word “reasonableness” as a ground for review was read into section 
145 of the LRA to bring it in line with the Constitutional provision which requires an 
administrative act to be lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. 
 
A similar approach was adopted in the recent case of Sanders v Cell C Provider 
Company (Pty) Limited,26 which dealt with the situation where a company terminates 
its arrangement with one franchisee and awards the franchise to a third party. 
 
The facts of the case are as follows: 
 
Cell C is a mobile-phone operator which sells airtime contracts, mobile phones and 
accessories to members of the public and, through franchise agreements, on a 
national basis.  Until 30 April 2010 Advance Worx and G-Worx were franchisees of 
Cell C, conducting business as Cell C Queenstown and Cell C King Williamstown, 
respectively.   
 
Mr Sanders was a general manager of these franchises.  Cell C gave Advance Worx 
and G-Worx notice that the franchise arrangements would terminate on 30 April 
2010, but they were obliged to continue with the normal operation of the business 
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until that date, after which they had to assist in the handing over and transition of 
these businesses to a new franchisee, PE Rack.  
 
The managing directors of Advance Worx and G-Worx informed Sanders and the 
other staff members that they would need to consult about retrenchments because of 
the termination of the franchise arrangements.  Sanders alleged that section 197 
applied to the transaction, and therefore his contract would transfer along with all the 
other employees to PE Rack.   
 
Both Cell C and PE Rack denied that section 197 applied, resulting in an application 
to the Labour Court. 
 
The Labour Court confirmed that section 197 of the LRA has a twofold purpose as 
stated by the Labour Appeal Court in the Aviation case, namely, to protect workers 
against the loss of employment in the event of a business transfer and to facilitate the 
sale of businesses as going concerns. 
 
The term “going concern” implies that what is transferred must be a business in 
operation. In determining whether this has occurred is a question of fact to be 
determined objectively in the light of the circumstances of each case.  
 
The absence of an agreement to transfer the employees of the “old employer” does 
not mean that it cannot be a transfer as a going concern. 
 
In this case the court took a “snapshot” test at the business, franchise, prior to 30 
April 2010 and the “new” business after 30 April 2010.  It found that the business 
remained located at the same place, had the same telephone number as well as the 
nature of the business remained the same.  The only visible change would be the 
faces of the new employees. 
 
The court stated that there was clearly a transfer of the business from one entity to 
another. 
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The court further went on to state that in following a literal interpretation of section 
197 of the LRA, there would be no transfer of the business and the purpose of 
section 197 to the extent that it is aimed at safeguarding jobs, would be defeated. 
 
In this case, Cell C has effectively outsourced its business by appointing franchisees. 
It decided to change the entity to whom business has been outsourced and it was 
free to do so.  However, this could not detract from the right of the employees 
affected by those decisions.  The employees were entitled to the protection afforded 
to them by the Constitution and the LRA.  
 
Therefore, the court held that the takeover of the business by PE Rack constituted a 
transfer in terms of section 197 of the LRA. 
 
Sanders was declared to have automatically transferred to PE Rack on the same 
terms and conditions as previously applied. 
 
The Aviation27 matter was however taken to the Supreme Court of Appeal by SAA. 
The issue that was before the court was the interpretation of section 197 of the LRA.  
The court had to decide whether there has been a second transfer of business as a 
going concern by the old employer to the new employer and possible subsequent 
transfers.  In the event of it finding that there had been subsequent transfers, whether 
section 197 of the LRA is applicable to such a transfer. 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal held that no other subsequent transfers have been 
proved saved for the first transfer between SAA and LGM. 
 
The first transfer referred to as first generation outsourcing and the second 
(subsequent) transfers referred to as second generation outsourcing. 
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SAA appealed to this court on two basis: Firstly that the Labour Appeal Court erred in 
its interpretation of section 197 of the LRA and secondly that it erred in finding on the 
facts that there was a transfer of a business as a going concern. 
 
The trade unions, AUSA and SATAWU, on the other hand argued that the purposive 
approach that was given by the Labour Appeal Court should be adopted and that the 
continuation of the services by SAA did amount to a transfer of a business as a going 
concern. 
 
SAA argued that the plain an unambiguous language of section 197 of the LRA 
clearly sets out the legislature‟s intention that section 197 should only apply where 
there is a transfer of a business as a going concern by the old employer to a new 
employer.  That section 39(2) of the Constitution, which compels interpretation of 
legislative provisions in the light of the values embedded in the Bill of Rights, applies 
only where the language of the statute is not unduly sustained. 
 
SAA relied on two Constitutional Court cases namely Investigating Directorate: 
Serious Economic Offences & others v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd & other 
and In re Huyndai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd & others v Smit NO & others.28 
 
In these two cases it was held that the judicial officers must prefer interpretation of 
legislation that falls within the constitutional bounds and that limits must be placed on 
the application of this principle.  There is a duty on the one hand on the judicial offers 
to interpret legislation in conformity with the Constitution and on the other hand to 
pass legislation that is clear and precise.   A balance will often have to be struck as to 
how tension is to be resolved when considering the constitutionality of a particular 
piece of legislation, but such legislation should not be unduly strained. 
 
It was held in Minister of Safety and Security v Sekhoto29 that there is a distinction 
between interpreting legislation to give effect to the Bill of Rights and reading in of 
words following upon a declaration of constitutional invalidity. 
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It held that interpreting legislation to give effect to the Bill of Rights is limited to what 
the text is capable of meaning and that the reading in of words should only take place 
if the legislation is founded to be unconstitutional. 
 
In S v Zuma30 the Constitutional Court also held that courts must caution against 
using the Constitution to interpret the language of the legislature to mean whatever 
the court wants it to mean. 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal held that there was no Constitutional challenge of 
section 197 and to read in words to mean something different was not legitimate. 
 
SAA contended that the language of section 197 is clear and unambiguous and have 
to be given its ordinary meaning.  In reading in words into the section as done by the 
Labour Appeal Court clearly represents a radical departure from the fundamental rule 
of statutory construction. 
 
SAA further argued that there was no evidence before the LAC to establish that there 
was a transfer of a business activity as a going concern.  That it is a factual matter 
that needs to be determined objectively by reference to all relevant factors 
considered cumulatively.  
 
The trade unions on the other hand argued that the only probable interference to be 
drawn was that there was a double transfer after the outsourcing agreement had 
been terminated and SAA.  The trade unions argued that such interference could be 
drawn from the affidavits which were placed before the Labour Court as evidence. 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal held that a court must base its decisions in motion 
proceedings upon the facts which are presented to it on paper and not on the 
weighing up of probabilities. 
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It accordingly held that the Labour Court‟s decision to dismiss the application was 
correct. 
 
From the above it is clear that second generation outsourcing does not attract the 
applicability of section 197 of the Labour Relations Act. 
 
I am of opinion that the Saunders case will soon follow with an appeal against the 
decision of the Labour Court as it strongly relied on the decision of the Labour Appeal 
Court in the Aviation matter which has now been overturned by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal. 
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CHAPTER 3 
SECTION 197 OF THE LRA AND OUTSOURCING TO A LABOUR 
BROKER 
 
In Chapter 2 it became clear that section 197 does apply to first-generation 
outsourcing and not to second-generation outsourcing. 
 
But does section 197 also apply to outsourcing of services to a labour broker? 
 
The matter was given consideration by the Labour Court in CEPPWAWU v Print 
Tech (Pty) Ltd.31 
 
The facts of the case were as follows: 
 
The respondent handed its employees a letter on the 25th of October 2004 informing 
them of its decision to restructure in terms of section 189 (3) of the LRA. The letter 
contained the following heading:  
 
“CONTEMPLATED DISMISSALS DUE TO OPERATIONAL REASONS” 
 
The respondent also envisage its intention to outsource its hourly paid production 
personnel to a labour broker. 
 
During a meeting on the 17th of October 2004, the issue of alternative positions with 
the labour broker was discussed with the effected employees.  The meeting was 
adjourned to the 29th of October 2004 to enable the employees to consider the 
alternative. 
 
On the 29th of October 2004 the employees contended that they wanted to meet the 
labour broker, which meeting was set up and held on the 1st and 2nd of November 
2004. 
                                                          
31
  [2010] 6 BLLR 601 (LC). 
 35 
 
The employees were encouraged to accept the alternative employment with the 
labour broker.  The applicants rejected the offer which resulted in their retrenchment. 
 
The dispute was referred to the CCMA for conciliation but was unsuccessful.  
 
The intention of the respondents was to retrench its entire labour force and outsource 
its activities to a labour broker. This was evident from a letter dated 10 November 
2004 which it addressed to its employees and which stated the following: 
 
“[t]he company has now decided to proceed with the process of outsourcing its labour 
force to the labour brokers, Colven Associates Border CC, as from 14 November 2004 
(effective date)”. 
 
It was common cause that the business of the respondents remained the same only 
but for the outsourcing of its labour force. 
 
Although the employees were outsourced, they would have continued to render the 
same services for the respondent. 
 
The local organizer of the union at the time contended that its members were 
unhappy to be transferred to the labour broker as their new contract would be a fix-
term contract whereas they were previously permanently employed.   
 
The union conceded that its members would have accepted the alternative if the 
contracts were permanent. 
 
In terms of the contract which was offered to the employees they would only be 
employed as long as the client needed their employment. 
 
The contract stated that: 
 
“assignment will automatically terminate when the Company is instructed by the Client 
to remove the Assignee and/or when the assignment as set out in of (sic) Annexure A 
end.  There will thus be no entitlement by the Assignee to notice or severance pay at 
any point whatsoever.” 
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The contract further stated that: 
 
“[t]he Assignee will not be entitled to participate in the funds, benefits and other 
conditions applicable to permanent employees of the Company and/or the Client”. 
 
The applicants contended that they were unfairly dismissed  as the respondent 
transferred a part of its business as a going concern without the their consent and  
without transferring all their existing rights and obligations of employment to the 
labour broker, which is contrary to the provision of section 197(2) of the LRA. 
 
The Labour Court had to decide the issue of whether section 197 is applicable to the 
outsourcing of services to a labour broker. 
 
The Labour Court held that the transfer of the labour force did not constitute 
outsourcing of “services” within the definition of section 197 of the LRA. 
 
In court relied on the Labour Court decision of NUMSA v Staman Automatic CC32 as 
authority for what constitutes a transfer of a business in terms of section 197. 
 
In Staman the court held as follows: 
 
“The NUMSA employees are regular employees of Staman. They place their labour 
potentional at the disposal of their employer and become entitled to remuneration. They 
work with either the machines that produce plastic products, machine operators or they 
are general workers. They are not employed to render a service on behalf of Staman. 
Their work is connected to the machines. The machines are part of Staman‟s 
infrastructure. Staman has no intention of parting with its machines by selling or 
disposing of them. There is clearly no transfer of the machines or the business. This is 
evident from the „transfer of business agreement‟.” 
 
The court also held that: 
 
“The services of the employees, in this case, are not an economic entity that will retain 
its identity after the purported transfer. That the employees may not see a difference as 
regard their job functions, because they will be contracted back to perform the same 
functions at Staman does not mean that they retain their previous identity. What 
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Staman and Jobmates seek to do is to define the employees by reference to their 
employment status and not as a stable economic entity.” 
 
The Labour Court in Print Tech accordingly held that there has been no transfer of 
services and that section 197 of the LRA is not applicable. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE EFFECT OF SECTION 197 OF THE LRA ON EMPLOYERS, 
BOTH “OLD” AND “NEW” 
 
It is important to reiterate the fact that section 197‟s purpose is to protect employment 
security during transfers. 
 
Section 197(2) lists the consequences of such a transfer for both the “old” and “new” 
employer and reads as follows: 
 
“If a transfer of a business takes place, unless otherwise agreed in terms of subsection 
(6) – 
 
(a) the new employer is automatically substituted in the place of the old employer in 
respect of all contracts of employment in existence immediately before the date of 
the transfer; 
(b) all the rights and obligations between the old employer and an employee at the 
time of the transfer continue in force as if they had been rights and obligations 
between the new employer and the employee; 
(c) anything done before the transfer by or in relation to the old employer, including 
the dismissal of an employee or the commission of an unfair labour practice or act 
of unfair discrimination, is considered to have been done by or in relation to the 
new employer, and 
(d) the transfer does not interrupt an employee‟s continuity of employment, and an 
employee‟s contract of employment continues with the new employer as if with 
the old employer.” 
 
From the above it is apparent that the new employer is bound by the actions of the 
old employer prior to the transfer of the business.  The “new” employer can also be 
held liable for the unfair dismissal of an employee by the “old” employer prior to the 
transfer.   
 
In the NUMSA v Success Panelbeaters and Service Centre CC t/a Score 
Panelbeaters and Service Centre33 an employee was unfairly dismissed by the old 
employer.  The court held that the employee had to be reinstated and that the new 
employer was obliged to take the employee into service.  
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From the above case it is clear that section 197(2) imposes great implications on the 
new employer. 
 
Another case illustrating one of such implications is that of Keil v Foodgro (a division 
of Leisurenet Ltd).34 
 
The facts of the case were as follows: 
 
The applicant was employed by MacRib Fast Food System (Pty) Ltd (“MacRib”) as its 
national public relations officer and marketing manager.  In 1997 MacRib was sold to 
the Respondent as a going concern.  The applicant was informed by MacRib that the 
business was being transferred to the respondent but ensured her that she would be 
employed by the respondent on the same terms and conditions as she had with 
MacRib. 
 
She continued to work for the respondent in the same position that she held at 
MacRib after the business was transferred. 
 
On 23 January 1997 she received and signed a letter of appointment, with the 
respondent setting out the terms and conditions of her employment with the 
respondent containing essentially the same terms and conditions as her old contract 
of employment with MacRib. 
 
The letter of appointment however set out the following: 
 
- That her appointment was effective only from 1 January 1997; 
 
- that the first three months of her employment would be probationary of nature; 
and 
 
                                                          
34
  [1999] 4 BLLR 345 (LC).  
 
 40 
- that the letter of appointment comprised the entire contract between her and 
Foodgro. 
 
The applicant was informed by the respondent on 30 May 1997 that her employment 
contract would be terminated on 30 June 2010 due to operational requirements. 
 
The letter was preceded by two meetings which were held between Foodgro officials 
and the applicant herself. 
 
On termination, the applicant‟s severance package was calculated from 1997 on the 
basis that she had only been employed by the respondent since 1 January 1997. 
 
The applicant brought an application before the Labour Court for unfair retrenchment. 
The Labour Court ruled in favour of the applicant and ordered the respondent to pay 
a statutory retrenchment package, calculated from 1993 as well as compensation 
plus costs. 
 
The respondent contended that he retrenched the applicant on the principle of last-
in–first-out.  It argued that the applicant was taken over in a transfer of business by it 
and that it had entered into a new contract with the applicant which only commenced 
on the date of transfer.  
 
The court rejected this argument on the ground that one of the consequences of a 
section 197 transfer is the continuity of the employment.  The respondent should 
have taken the applicant‟s service with MacRib into account.  
 
The matter was taken on appeal by the respondent.35 
 
The appellant based its appeal on the following grounds: 
 
- That the court a quo  had erred in finding that the letter of appointment did not 
replace the employment contract with the previous employer; and 
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- that the letter of appointment did not affect the previous length of service. 
 
The issue before the Labour Appeal Court was the proper interpretation of the LRA. 
 
It was held by the Labour Appeal Court that the primary aim of section 197 of the 
LRA was to extend greater protection to employees than that available in common 
law. 
 
While amendment of the terms and conditions of employment on transfer of a 
business, by agreement between the parties, is provided for in section 197(2)(a) of 
the LRA, section 197(4) expressly forbids contracting out of transfer of employment 
contract or interruption of period of service. 
 
The court came to the conclusion that the letter of appointment did not replace the 
original employment contract or affected the previous length of service. 
 
The appeal application was dismissed with costs. 
 
This case resulted in the transferred employees being safeguarded from being 
selected for retrenchment by the new employer on the basis of the last-in-first-out 
election criterion. 
 
The effect of section 197 is, however, not without any exceptions. 
 
In terms of section 197(3)(a) of the LRA the new employer is not expected to provide 
the employees with contracts of employment with exactly the same terms and 
conditions as those of the old employer, unless such terms and conditions were 
determined by a collective agreement in which event the new employer would have 
to comply with them.  
 
The new employer may offer different terms and conditions to employees after 
transfer to the extent that such terms and conditions are on the whole not less 
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favourable to the employees than those to which they were employed by the old 
employer. 
 
Should the new employer wish to change the terms and conditions of such an 
employment contract it will have to be in writing and concluded between either the 
old employer, the new employer, or the old and new employers acting jointly, on the 
one hand, and the appropriate person or body referred to in section 189(1) on the 
other hand.  
 
From the above it is apparent that it is possible to contract out of the same terms and 
conditions of the employment contract.  The next question is whether it is possible to 
contract out of all the consequences of section 197 of the LRA. 
 
In the Foodgro case the court held that it was not possible to contract out of the 
continuity of employment.  Although this decision was made under the old section 
197, it would seem that the current section 197 does allow contracting out of any one 
or more of the consequences listed in section 197(2). 
 
In SACWU v Engen Petroleum Ltd36 the court held that employees could only insist 
on such terms and conditions which existed between them with the old employer at 
the time of the transfer.  They could not insist on better terms and conditions of 
employment.  
 
It is also important to bear in mind that not all rights are provided by the employer, 
having the effect that such rights cannot be transferred in terms of the old section 
197.  Examples of such rights would include pension benefits which are governed by 
section 14 of the Pension Funds Act, 1956.   
 
The current section 197 of the LRA now clearly allows the transfer of employees from 
one pension fund to another as a result of a transfer of business provided that such 
transfer complies with section 14 of the Pension Funds Act, 1956.  Employees may 
thus be transferred without their consent to a different pension fund, provident, 
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retirement or similar fund from the one to which they belonged prior to the transfer, 
provided that it complies with section 14 of the Pension Funds Act, 1956. 
 
Section 14(1) of the Pension Funds Act states that: 
 
“No transaction involving the amalgamation of any business carried on by a registered 
fund with any business carried on by any other person (irrespective of whether that 
person is or is not a registered fund), or the transfer of any business from a registered 
fund to any other person, or the transfer of any business from any other person to a 
registered fund shall be of any force or effect unless – (c) the registrar is satisfied that 
the scheme referred to in paragraph (a) is reasonable and equitable and accords full 
recognitions – 
 
(i) to the rights and reasonable benefit expectations of the persons concerned in 
terms of the rules of a fund concerned, and 
(ii) to any additional benefits the payment of which has become established  practice, 
and that the proposed transactions would not render any fund which is a party 
thereto and which will continue to exist if the proposed transaction is completed, 
unable to meet the requirement of this Act or to remain in a sound financial 
condition or, in the case of a fund which is not in a sound financial condition, to 
attain such a condition within a period of time deemed by the registrar to be 
satisfactory.” 
 
The above consequences are not the only ones.  Section 197(7) – (9) set out some 
additional principles. 
 
Section 197(7) states that: 
 
“The old employer must – 
 
(a) agree with the new employer to a valuation as at the date of transfer of – 
 
(i) the leave pay accrued to the transferred employees of the old employer; 
(ii) the severance pay that would have been payable to the transferred 
employees of the old employer in the event of a dismissal by reason of the 
employer‟s operational requirements; and 
(iii) any other payment that have accrued to the transferred employees but have 
not been paid to employees of the old employer; 
 
(b) conclude a written agreement that specifies- 
 
(i) which employer is liable for paying any amount referred to in paragraph (a), 
and in the case of apportionment of liability between them, the terms of that 
apportionment, and 
(ii) what provisions has been made for any payment contemplated in paragraph 
(a) if any employee becomes entitled to receive a payment; 
 
 44 
(c) disclose the terms of the agreement contemplated in paragraph (b) to each 
employee who after the transfer becomes employed by the new employer; and 
 
(d) take any other measure that may be reasonable in the circumstances to ensure 
that adequate provision is made for any obligation on the new employer that may 
arise in terms of paragraph (a).” 
 
Section 197(8) states that: 
 
“For a period of 12 months after the date of the transfer, the old employer is jointly and 
severally liable with the new employer to any employee who becomes entitled to 
receive a payment contemplated in subsection (7)(a) as a result of the employee‟s 
dismissal for a reason relating to the employer‟s operational requirements or the 
employer‟s liquidation or sequestration, unless the old employer is able to show that it 
has complied with the provisions of this section.” 
 
Section 197(9) states that: 
 
“The old and new employer are jointly and severally liable in respect of any claim 
concerning any term or condition of employment that arose prior to the transfer.” 
 45 
CHAPTER 5 
EMPLOYERS RIGHTS IN RESPECT OF A DISMISSAL AS A RESULT 
OF A TRANSFER 
 
An employee enjoys very little protection against unfair dismissal under our common 
law.  The common law focuses on the lawfulness of the employment contract 
between the parties and not the reason for the dismissal.  Under the common law the 
employer can do virtually what he likes. 
 
This was the main reason for the implementation of labour legislation.  Such 
legislation is aimed to redress the imbalance of power between the employer and 
employee.   
 
Under common law the employer has all the power and can threaten to dismiss an 
employee should he not agree to its terms and conditions of employment, 
irrespective of whether such conditions are reasonable and fair. 
 
The common law is also now experiencing the effect of the Constitution, more 
specifically section 23(1) thereof which reads as follows: 
 
“Everyone has the right to fair labour practices.” 
 
Section 186(1)(f) of the LRA describes a dismissal to mean that - 
 
“an employee terminated a contract of employment with or without notice because the 
new employer, after a transfer in terms of section 197 or section 197A, provided the 
employee with conditions or circumstances at work that are substantially less 
favourable to the employee than those provided by the old employer.” 
 
This type of dismissal occurs when an employee is transferred to a new employer 
and the new employer provides for terms and conditions of the employment contract 
that are substantially less favourable than those provided by the old employer and as 
a result thereof the employee resigns. 
 
Such a resignation by the employee will be regarded as a constructive dismissal. 
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In order to succeed on a claim of constructive dismissal the employee must prove, as 
also set out in Mafomane v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Limited,37 the following: 
 
(a) the employee terminated the contract; 
(b) continued employment was intolerable; 
(c) the intolerability was of the employer‟s making; and 
(d) the employee resigned as a result of the intolerable behaviour of the employer. 
 
The test for “intolerable” is an objective one.  The question that one should ask is 
whether any reasonable employee in the circumstances would have found the 
circumstances to be intolerable.  
 
The intolerability must have been due to an act of the employer and there must have 
been no other means, except resignation, available to the employee.  The employee 
will have to prove the link between the resignation and the intolerability. 
 
The test is two-fold.  Firstly, the employee must establish that there was no voluntary 
intention by the employee to resign and secondly the court must consider the 
employer‟s conduct as a whole and determine whether its effect is of such a nature 
that the employee cannot be expected to tolerate it. 
 
In the Jooste v Transnet Limited t/a SA Airways38 the court pointed out that the timing 
of the resignation and the education of the employee are of significant importance 
when deciding whether the resignation was voluntary. 
 
The resignation must also have been an action of last resort by the employee.  Same 
was confirmed by the commissioner in Smith v Magnum Security.39 
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In order to prove that the resignation was the “last resort”, it was held in Beets v 
University of Port Elizabeth40 by the commissioner that the employee would have to 
prove that some degree of coercion, duress or undue influence was involved. 
 
It was submitted in the Watt v Honeydew Diaries (Pty) Limited41 that the employee 
bears a considerable risk in the case of constructive dismissal for a number of 
reasons.  
 
The first is that the employee must resign and if such employee is unable to show the 
requisite conditions that render continued employment intolerable then the 
resignation remain valid.  Secondly, the onus of proof is on the employee.  Thirdly, 
the test is an objective one and finally there exist no concise guidelines for 
constructive dismissal. 
 
However, it would seem that an employer would not be able to justify such a 
constructive dismissal in terms of section 186(1)(f).  
 
The only question that one needs to ask is whether the employer offered less 
favourable terms and conditions of employment and if so, whether they were 
substantially less favourable.  
 
The next question would be to ask whether the employer created an intolerable 
working environment that leaves the employee little option but to resign and claim 
constructive dismissal. 
 
The employee will only have to prove that the new terms and conditions of 
employment are less favourable than that of the old employer.  The onus will then be 
on the employer to justify such conditions of employment.  
 
This seems to be a form of constructive dismissal without the need for the employee 
to prove that the employer has made continued employment “intolerable”. 
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Should the new employer simply decide to dismiss the employee as a result of a 
transfer of a business, or a reason related to a transfer as contemplated in section 
197 or section 197A, such dismissal would be regarded as automatically unfair 
dismissal – section 187(1)(g) of the LRA. 
 
In the case of an automatically unfair dismissal the employer will not be able to 
defend the termination of the employee by proving that there was a fair reason for 
such a dismissal.   
 
There is, however, once again an exception.   
 
The employer will be able to justify the termination if he can prove that the dismissal 
was based on an inherent requirement of the job or that the dismissal is one based 
on age if the employee has reached the normal or agreed retirement age of persons 
employed in that capacity. 
 
Section 187(2) of the LRA reads as follows: 
 
“Despite subsection (1)(f) – 
 
(a) a dismissal may be fair if the reason for dismissal is based on an inherent 
requirement of the particular job; 
 
(b) a dismissal based on age is fair if the employee has reached the normal or 
agreed retirement age for persons employed in that capacity.” 
 
In Dlamini v Green Four Security42 the applicants, who were all security guards, were 
dismissed for refusing to shave or trim their beards because it was against their 
religious convictions to do so.  They claimed their dismissals were automatically 
unfair and sought compensation of 12 months‟ remuneration. 
 
The respondent argued that the applicants were contractually bound to be clean 
shaven and that they had been beardless when they commenced their employment. 
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The court found that it was obliged to consider the constitutional implications of the 
dispute between the parties, which entailed a three-step process: firstly, whether the 
facts amounted to discrimination; secondly, if the answer is yes, whether it is capable 
of being justified as an inherent requirement of the job, and thirdly, if it is in fact an 
inherent requirement of the job, is it discriminatory on the basis that the impact is not 
ameliorated by a reasonable accommodation, modification of or exemption from the 
rule? 
 
The court further held that the onus was on the applicants to prove that not to shave 
their beards was a requirement of the religion.  
 
It was held that the applicants had failed to discharge this onus.  The court made this 
finding on the facts that the applicants were selective of which part or rule of the 
religion they adhered to as they worked on Sundays, which was also prohibited by 
their church. 
 
The court then went to the second step to determine whether the discrimination 
against the applicant could be justified as an inherent requirement of the job.  
 
It held that it was the respondent‟s onus to prove that the rule was justified and found 
that the primary justification for the rule was neatness and hygiene.  The court found 
that the rule had a clear purpose as opposed to the rule of the religion. 
 
In considering the third step, in ascertaining whether the respondent had sought to 
accommodate the applicants reasonably, the court held that the applicants did not 
challenge any failure by the respondent in this regard, and even if the respondent did 
in fact offer them an alternative, they would not have accepted it. 
 
Accordingly the court held the dismissal to be fair. 
 
From the above case law it is clear that one will have to follow a three-step process 
in determining whether a dismissal based on discrimination is fair.  One will firstly 
have to establish whether there is discrimination, a differentiation between parties or 
workers.  
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If the answer to this question is “no”, then there is no need to proceed to step two 
and three, but if the answer is “yes”, step two and three will have to be complied with 
in order to establish the fairness or justification of the discriminatory event. 
 
It is further important to take note that a dismissal for operational reasons will only be 
fair in relation to a section 197 transfer if the dismissal is based on the operational 
requirements of the old employer and not those of the new employer. 
 
An important case is that of Western Cape Workers Association v Halgang Properties 
CC.43 
 
The facts of the case were as follows: 
 
The employer sold its business to one Wembly.  It was an agreed term in the sale 
agreement that upon date of transfer all risk and benefit of ownership in respect of 
the business would pass to Wembly. 
 
Prior to the date of transfer, several meetings were held between the workers of the 
employer and a representative of Wembly to resolve the question of the transfer of 
their employment contracts to Wembly. 
 
They were told that their contracts would be transferred on the same terms and 
conditions and those years of service would be recognised, but for administrative 
reasons, they would have to enter into a new contract with Wembly. 
 
The workers refused and insisted that they be paid for their years of service with their 
employer and that they be kept in his employment, and not be transferred. 
 
In the light of this, the employer considered that the only other option open to him 
would be to retrench the workers for operational requirements. His reason being that 
he was selling a major portion of his business. 
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The employer then invited the workers and their union to make possible 
representation on how retrenchments could be avoided, to discuss retrenchment 
benefits and other matters. 
 
The workers refused, taking the view that the employer was “still alive and kicking”. 
 
A dispute occurred and the matter was referred to the CCMA. 
 
Discussion, however, continued and the workers were offered a one-year 
employment contract by Wembly, but demanded an indefinite contract, which 
Wembly refused. 
 
The employer then addressed a letter to the workers recording their dismissal for 
operational requirements, tendering four weeks written notice and indicating that their 
refusal of the offer of employment disentitled them to severance pay. 
 
The union, on behalf of two workers, took the matter to the Labour Court, seeking an 
order for reinstatement. 
 
The Labour Court held that the workers had been unfairly dismissed by the employer 
and directed the employer to reinstate them. 
 
The decision was taken on appeal where the Labour Appeal Court held that the 
business had already been transferred as a going concern and that reinstatement 
was no longer possible. 
 
It held that the union sought a reinstatement order that would be binding on Wembly, 
but that he should have been joined to the proceedings. 
 
The court upheld an appeal for want of joinder. 
 
The Labour Court found it unnecessary to consider the question whether the 
dismissal of the workers had been substantially or procedurally fair. 
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The applicants made an application for appealing against the order of the Labour 
Appeal Court. 
 
They applied for a certificate in term of Rule 18, which the Labour Appeal Court 
declined on the basis that no proper case had been made for condonation of the late 
application for such a certificate. 
 
The court, however, considered it desirable in the interest of justice to deal with the 
matter at once. 
 
The applicants alleged that the decision of the Labour Appeal Court infringed the 
rights of the workers to fair labour practices.  It further contended that unfair dismissal 
by the employer had to be deemed to have been committed by Wembly and that the 
reinstatement order against the employer had consequently to be deemed to be 
against Wembly as there was a transfer as a going concern. 
 
The applicants used as authority the judgment of Success Panel Beater & Service 
Centre CC v NUMSA.44  In this case the Labour Appeal Court sanctioned the notion 
that the “new employer” would be bound by a declaratory order of the court for 
reinstatement of an employee who was dismissed by the “old employer” prior to the 
transfer of the business as a going concern. 
 
The Labour Appeal Court in the Halgang Properties case, however, held that the 
applicants could not use the Panel Beater case as authority.  This case was different 
from the one at hand as there was a waiver of joinder, which was lacking in this case. 
 
The Labour Appeal Court held that the correct procedure would be to join the new 
employer to the proceedings. 
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The Constitutional Court held that they could not fault the decision of the Labour 
Appeal Court and further held that it would not be in the interest of justice to grant 
leave to appeal. 
 
The application for appeal was accordingly dismissed by the court. 
 
From the above case law one can draw the conclusion that a “new employer” can be 
joined in an application for unfair dismissal against the “old employer” prior to the 
transfer of the business as a going concern.  This will have the result of the “new 
employer” being held accountable for the unlawful actions of the “old employer” 
against an employee and can result in a declaratory order being made against the 
“old employer”, which will be binding on the “new employer”, provided that the “new 
employer” is joined to the proceedings. 
 
The effect of this declaration is that employees are safeguarded.  
 
In order for a dismissal based on operational requirements to be procedurally fair, the 
employer will have to comply with section 189 of the LRA. 
 
Section 189 reads as follows: 
 
“(1)  When an employer contemplates dismissing one or more employees for reasons 
based on the employer‟s operational requirements, the employer must consult –  
 
(a)  any person whom the employer is required to consult in terms of a collective 
agreement;  
 
(b) if there is no collective agreement that requires consultation, a workplace 
forum, if the employees likely to be affected by the proposed dismissals are 
employed in a workplace in respect of which there is a workplace forum;  
 
(c)  if there is no workplace forum in the workplace in which the employees likely 
to be affected by the proposed dismissals are employed, any registered 
trade union whose members are likely to be affected by the proposed 
dismissals;  
 
(d) if there is no such trade union, the employees likely to be affected by the 
proposed dismissals or their representatives nominated for that purpose.  
 
(2)  The consulting parties must attempt to reach consensus on  
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(a) appropriate measures – 
  
(i)  to avoid the dismissals;  
(ii)  to minimise the number of dismissals;  
(iii)  to change the timing of the dismissals; and  
(iv)  to mitigate the adverse effects of the dismissals;  
 
(b)  the method for selecting the employees to be dismissed; and  
 
(c)  the severance pay for dismissed employees.  
 
(3)  The employer must disclose in writing to the other consulting party all relevant 
information, including, but not limited to –  
 
(a)  the reasons for the proposed dismissals;  
 
(b)  the alternatives that the employer considered before proposing the 
dismissals, and the reasons for rejecting each of those alternatives;  
 
(c)  the number of employees likely to be affected and the job categories in 
which they are employed;  
 
(d)  the proposed method for selecting which employees to dismiss;  
 
(e)  the time when, or the period during which, the dismissals are likely to take 
effect; the severance pay proposed;  
 
(f)  any assistance that the employer proposes to offer to the employees likely 
to be dismissed; and  
 
(g) the possibility of the future re-employment of the employees who are 
dismissed.  
 
(4)  The provisions of section 16 apply, read with the changes required by the context, 
to the disclosure of information in terms of subsection (3).  
 
(5)  The employer must allow the other consulting party an opportunity during 
consultation to make representations about any matter on which they are 
consulting.  
 
(6)  The employer must consider and respond to the representations made by the 
other consulting party and, if the employer does not agree with them, the 
employer must state the reasons for disagreeing.  
 
(7)  The employer must select the employees to be dismissed according to selection 
criteria –  
 
(a) that have been agreed to by the consulting parties; or  
 
(b)  if no criteria have been agreed, criteria that are fair and objective.” 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE RIGHTS OF EMPLOYEES IN TERMS OF SECTION 197A OF THE 
LRA WHERE THEIR EMPLOYER IS SEQUESTRATED OR HIS 
BUSINESS LIQUIDATED 
 
In the past the employment contracts of employees were terminated upon the 
insolvency of their employer.  They had a limited claim against the insolvent estate of 
their insolvent employer. 
 
However, section 38 of the Insolvency Act No 24 of 1936 and section 197A of the 
LRA now apply to the employment contracts of employees of an insolvent employer. 
 
Section 38 of the Insolvency Act has the effect of suspending contracts of 
employment from date of granting of the sequestration or winding up order, including 
the provisional order. 
 
During suspension the employees do not render their services and are not 
remunerated.  No employment benefits accrue to the employees during such 
suspension. 
 
The suspended employees are entitled to claim unemployment compensation from 
date of suspension.  
 
Section 38 of the Insolvency Act further imposes a duty on the trustee or liquidator of 
the insolvent employer to consult before he/she may terminate the employment of 
any of the employees. 
 
He/she must consult with the persons designated in terms of a collective agreement, 
a workplace forum or the affected employees or their trade unions.  The purpose of 
such consultation is to attempt to reach consensus on appropriate measures to save 
the whole or a part of the business, which may include a transfer in terms of section 
197A of the LRA. 
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Unless the liquidator or trustee and employee agree on continued employment, all 
employment contracts automatically terminate within 45 days.  The employee will 
then have a claim against the insolvent estate of the employer for any loss suffered 
as a consequence thereof. 
 
In such an event the employees will be entitled to severance pay under section 41 of 
the Basic Conditions of Employment Act No.75 of 1997 which reads as follows: 
 
“(1)  For the purposes of this section, “operational requirements” means requirements 
based on the economic, technological, structural or similar needs of an employer. 
 
(2)  An employer must pay an employee who is dismissed for reasons based on the 
employer‟s operational requirements severance pay equal to at least one week‟s 
remuneration for each completed year of continuous service with that employer, 
calculated in accordance with section 35. 
 
(3)  The Minister may vary the amount of severance pay in terms of subsection (2) by 
notice in the Gazette.  This variation may only be done after consulting NEDLAC 
and the Public Service Co-ordinating Bargaining Council established under 
Schedule 1 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. 
 
(4)  An employee who unreasonably refuses to accept the employer‟s offer of 
alternative employment with that employer or any other employer, is not entitled to 
severance pay in terms of subsection (2). 
 
(5)  The payment of severance pay in compliance with this section does not affect an 
employee‟s right to any other amount payable according to law. 
 
(6) If there is a dispute only about the entitlement to severance pay in terms of this 
section, the employee may refer the dispute in writing to –  
 
(a)  a council, if the parties to the dispute fall within the registered scope of that 
council; or 
 
(b)  the CCMA, if no council has jurisdiction. 
 
(7)  The employee who refers the dispute to the council or the CCMA must satisfy it 
that a copy of the referral has been served on all the other parties to the dispute. 
 
(8) The council or the CCMA must attempt to resolve the dispute through conciliation. 
 
(9)  If the dispute remains unresolved, the employee may refer it to arbitration. 
 
(10)  If the Labour Court is adjudicating a dispute about a dismissal based on the 
employer‟s operational requirements, the Court may inquire into and determine 
the amount of any severance pay to which the dismissed employee may be 
entitled and the Court may make an order directing the employer to pay that 
amount.” 
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Section 197A and section 197B of the LRA applies to all transfers as a going concern 
where the employer is insolvent. 
 
Section 197A reads as follows: 
 
“(1) This section applies to the transfer of a business – 
 
(a) if the old employer is insolvent; or 
(b)  
(b)  if a scheme of arrangement or compromise is being entered into to avoid 
winding up sequestration for reasons of insolvency. 
  
(2) Despite the Insolvency Act, 1936 (Act No. 24 of 1936), if a transfer of a business 
takes place in the circumstances contemplated in subsection (1) unless otherwise 
agreed in terms of section 197(6) – 
  
(a)  the new employer is automatically substituted in the place of the old 
employer in all contracts of employment in existence immediately before the 
old employer‟s provisional winding up or sequestration; 
  
(b)   all the rights and obligations between the old employer and each employee 
at the time of the transfer remain rights and obligations between the old 
employer and each employee; 
  
(c)   anything done before the transfer by the old employer in respect of each 
employee is considered to have been done by the old employer; 
  
(d)   the transfer does not interrupt the employee‟s continuity of employment and 
the employee‟s contract of employment continues with the new employer as 
if with the old employer. 
 
(3)  Section 197(3), (4), (5) and (10) applies to a transfer in terms of this section and 
any reference to an agreement in that section must be read as a reference to an 
agreement contemplated in section 197(6). 
  
(4) Section 197(5) applies to a collective agreement or arbitration binding on the 
employer immediately before the employer‟s provisional winding up or 
sequestration. 
  
(5) Section 197(7), (8) and (9) does not apply to a transfer in accordance with this 
section.” 
  
Section 197B reads as follows: 
  
“(1) An employer that is facing financial difficulties that may reasonably result in the 
winding up or sequestration of the employer must advise a consulting party 
contemplated in section 189(1). 
  
(2) (a) An employer that applies to be wound up or sequestrated, whether  in terms 
of the Insolvency Act, 1936 or any other law, must at the time of making 
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application, provide a consulting party contemplated in section 189(1) with a 
copy of the application. 
  
(c) An employer that receives an application for its winding up or sequestration 
must supply a copy of the application to any consulting party contemplated 
in section 189(1), within two days of receipt, or if the proceedings are urgent, 
within 12 hours.” 
 
In the matter of Jenkin v Khumbula Media Connexion (Pty) Ltd45 the Labour Court 
had to decide whether the dismissal of the applicant was procedurally fair, if yes, 
what compensation should be paid and whether the business of African Impression 
Media was transferred to the respondent as a going concern in terms of section 197A 
of the LRA. 
 
The facts of the case were as follows: 
 
The applicant worked as a printer for Transnet which was referred to as Transnet 
Production House.  His duties involved making copies of documents and manuals for 
customers which he would then bind. 
 
Transnet Production House was acquired by a company Linkallooh (Pty) Ltd in 
January 1991 which traded as Skotaville Press which became African Impression 
Media (Pty) Ltd in 2002. 
 
The applicant contended that his duties remained the same as well as his terms and 
conditions of employment.  He was performing his duties as if nothing had changed. 
 
The name of the company changed again in 2006 to Khumbula Media Connexion. 
 
The applicant contended that everything remained the same, except for the name of 
his employer.  His manager was the same person and the CEO as far as he was 
aware was also the same person. 
 
The applicant did not apply for a new position with the company, neither was he 
approached to sign any contract.  In March 2007 people arrived at the applicant‟s 
                                                          
45
  2010 (ZALC) 78 (2 June 2010). 
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office and started removing furniture.  He sought legal advice and wrote to the 
respondent on the 12th of March 2007 informing them that he would continue to 
report for work until told otherwise. 
 
He received a response on 13 April 2007 informing him that the lease of the 
premises expired and that he should stay at home until further notice as the company 
is looking for other premises. 
 
He was also advised that he would receive his full pay and employment benefits. 
 
During the end of 2007 the applicant was informed by his medical aid that his 
membership had lapsed due to non-payment of his premiums by the respondent. 
 
When the applicant queried this with Mr Ngcobo, in the respondent‟s employ, at a 
meeting in December 2007 he also requested copies of payslips that he had not 
received and requested that the medical aid premiums be paid. 
 
Mr Ngcobo advised him that he would look into the matter and get back to him. Mr 
Ngcobo further informed him that he would return to him with a retrenchment 
proposal when they meet again in January 2008. 
 
No meeting took place in January.  The applicant continued to receive his usual 
salary for December and January. 
 
The applicant received an amount of R16 224.00 in February 2008 as payment of the 
arrear medical aid contributions. 
 
The applicant did not receive his salary for March.  When he queried this lapse he 
was told by the respondent that his contract had terminated.  The respondent 
presented the court with an unsigned contract which purported to have placed the 
applicant on a one-year fixed term contract commencing on the 18th of October 2006 
and expiring on the 30th of September 2007, together with a 
“Severance/Retrenchment Package” which was also unsigned. 
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The applicant responded that this was the first time that he saw the contract and 
“Severance/Retrenchment Package” and that he had not entered into such contract 
or package as alleged. 
 
Mr Ngcobo testified to the effect that in May 2006 African Impression Media (Pty) Ltd, 
of which he was the owner, was placed under provisional liquidation  at which time 
he became a consultant to the respondent, Khumbula Media Connexion (Pty) Ltd, a 
company owned by his wife. 
 
It is clear from the evidence that African Impression Media (Pty) Ltd continued its 
operation until March 2007 when its furniture was removed. 
 
The only change appears to have been that with effect from October 2006.  The 
offices were run and operated by the respondent.  This was evidenced by the payslip 
issued to the applicant in September.  However, the payslip which was given to the 
applicant in October reflected the employer as Khumbula Media Connexion.  All the 
other particulars on the payslip were identical except for the date of engagement of 
the applicant which was reflected as 1 October 2006 such as to his previous payslips 
which recorded the date as 17 August 1981.  
 
Mr Ngcobo could not offer evidence to establish what had transpired regarding the 
liquidation, any agreement, if any, with the liquidators and any details regarding the 
contracts and the customers that he suggested were different from those his 
company African Impression Media had dealt with. 
 
His evidence was to the effect that he did not consider the continuation of the printing 
centre to be a transfer of business or a part thereof as a going concern and 
accordingly the applicant‟s retrenchment package should not take into consideration 
the applicant‟s previous years of employment. 
 
Concerning the retrenchment package, he contended that it was discussed with the 
applicant, although not signed.  He was unable to explain why the respondent had 
not complied with the terms of the purported agreement. 
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He suggested that the applicant had applied for employment after the liquidation of 
African Impression Media during a meeting in December and that alternative 
employment was offered to the applicant in Johannesburg, which was turned down. 
 
The applicant in return again reiterated the fact that he had never seen the unsigned 
document. 
 
The Labour Court referred to the case of Johnson & Johnson (Pty) Ltd v Chemical 
Workers and Industrial Union46 in considering the procedural fairness of the dismissal 
of the applicant. 
 
In the Johnson & Johnson case the court clearly sets out the requirements for 
compliance with the procedural aspects of section 189 of the LRA.  The Labour Court 
stated as follows: 
 
“The important implication of this is that a mechanical, „checklist‟ kind of approach to 
determine whether s 189 has been complied with is inappropriate.  The proper 
approach is to ascertain whether the purpose of the section (the occurrence of a joint 
consensus seeking process) has been achieved.”  
 
The court in the matter of Jenkin found that the respondent did not comply with 
section 189 and that the applicant‟s dismissal was procedurally unfair. 
 
Concerning section 197A of the LRA the court looked at the definition of business in 
the LRA. 
 
The court held that section 197A only applies in cases of insolvency.  This section 
specifically provides that if the old employer is insolvent, the contract of employment 
does not automatically terminate where a transfer of a business takes place.  In such 
a situation the new employer is automatically substituted in the place of the old 
employer. 
 
                                                          
46
  (1999) 20 ILJ 89 (LAC). 
 62 
In considering the evidence before it, the court found that a transfer as envisaged by 
section 197A of the LRA did take place and as a consequence section 197A(2)(d) is 
applicable in the calculation of the severance pay of the applicant. 
 
From the above case law it is clear that the employees of an insolvent employer do 
enjoy protection under section 197A of the LRA.  
 63 
CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
From the discussion contained in this treatise it is clear that employees do enjoy 
extensive protection when a business is transferred by its employer as a going 
concern. 
 
Employers must be careful when considering terminating employment contracts of 
their employees because they are selling their business or utilising outsourcing 
services.  This may result in unfair dismissal claims for which the “new” employer can 
be held accountable. 
 
The employment continuity of the employees is also not interrupted by the transfer. In 
the event of their being retrenched in the future by the new employer, their years of 
service with the “old” employer will have to be taken into account when determining 
their severance packages.  Failure in this regard will result in the retrenchment being 
unfair. 
 
Retrenchment of employees will also only be fair if the retrenchment is based on the 
operational requirements of the “old” employer. 
 
The employee is entitled to terms and conditions that are not less favourable to those 
which it had with its “old” employer. 
 
The purpose of section 197 of the LRA is to protect employment security during 
transfers. 
 
An employer who wishes to outsource its activities will also have to comply with 
section 197 of the LRA as section 197 applies to the outsourcing of services, 
provided that it passes the test of a transfer of a business as a going concern by the 
old employer to the new employer. 
 
Section 197 of the LRA does not apply to second-generation outsourcing. 
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The Supreme Court of Appeal held that when legislation is clear and unambiguous, 
the intention of the legislature must prevail.  The only instance where words must be 
read into legislation is to bring it in line with the Constitution. 
 
It is not the function of the court to draft legislation. 
 
Outsourcing to a labour broker is not covered by section 197 of the LRA and 
employees will not enjoy its protection. 
 
In the case of the employer being sequestrated or liquidated, the employment 
contract does not automatically terminate or come to an end.  Section 38 of the 
Insolvency Act provides for the suspension of the contract.  This situation is also 
regulated by section 197A of the LRA. 
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